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COMMENTS
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND TRIAL PUBLICITY: ANOTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL AITACK ON DR 7-107-Hirschkop v. Snead
I. INTRODUCTION
Philip J. Hirschkop brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsi-
bility,' was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.2 DR 7-107, generally
referred to as the "no-comment" rule,3 prohibits extrajudicial statements
1. DR 7-107 was adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia upon petition by the Virginia
State Bar and pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d 356, 362, 374-76 (4th Cir. 1979) (Appendix). See RULES OF COURT, 211 Va. 295, 347-50
(1970). DR 7-107 is set forth in the appendix to this comment.
2. It was Hirschkop's contention that DR 7-107 was facially unconstitutional for vagueness
and overbreadth, as it violated his right to freedom of speech protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,
362 (4th Cir. 1979). The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." It has been made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (invalidating injunc-
tive remedies against "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" periodicals).
Hirschkop also had contended in the district court that DR 7-107 was unconstitutional as
applied to him. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1140 (E.D. Va. 1976).
Hirschkop, who had been a controversial lawyer in many civil rights and civil liberties cases,
had been the subject of eleven of the twenty-two complaints filed with the Virginia State Bar
from 1965 to 1975 charging violations of DR 7-107. The final complaint alleged that Hirschkop
had done nothing more than tell the press that he was representing an indicted prison official
because the official was "a good guy." Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 1979).
Eventually, Hirschkop and the Virginia State Bar reached a settlement in which the Bar
admitted that the complaints against Hirschkop were "meritless and had been filed in cases
where the complainants may have disagreed with the causes supported and espoused" by
Hirschkop. Id. at 363. Hirschkop agreed to dismiss his claim against the Bar for selective
enforcement. The Justices of the Supreme Court of Virginia, who took no part in the settle-
ment agreement, were retained as defendants because in their official capacity they had
adopted the rule on petition of the Virginia State Bar. Id. at n.4. Thus, the only issue before
the Fourth Circuit was the facial constitutionality of DR 7-107. Id. at 363.
3. A brief background into the promulgation of DR 7-107 will be helpful for a better
understanding of Hirschkop's action. DR 7-107 is the successor of Canon 20 of the ABA
CANONS OF PROFEsSIoNAL ETHICS, which stated:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may inter-
fere with a fair trial in the courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of
justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstance of a particu-
lar case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously.
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and
papers on file in the court; but even in the extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex
parte statement.
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by attorneys regarding pending litigation in which they are involved, "if
.there is a reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will interfere with
a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice."'
The district court declared that DR 7-107 was constitutionally sound,5
The promulgation of DR 7-107 to replace Canon 20 was based on several factors. Initially,
the standards of Canon 20 were vague and difficult to apply, and did little to forewarn lawyers
of permissible and impermissible areas of speech. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th
Cir. 1979). In addition, there was an increasing number of appeals to state and federal courts
on the ground of pretrial publicity. 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 654, 665 (1976). Many of these
appeals were related to the technological advances in the communications media, particularly
television. Id. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (televising of sensational trial held
denial of due process); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (denial of change of venue
by trial judge after confession of accused to sheriff had been repeatedly televised in area from
which jurors were drawn held denial of due process). As a result of these appeals there was a
growing concern among members of the Bar that efforts had to -be taken to balance the
public's right to know with the right of the accused to a fair trial. The extreme example came
in 1964 when the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY (1964), concluded that it would have been imposssible for Lee Harvey Oswald to
have obtained a fair trial. Id. at 242. All of these factors culminated in Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333 (1966), in which the Supreme Court directed courts to adopt rules and regula-
tions to protect their processes from prejudicial influences. Id. at 363. See note 30 infra for a
discussion of Sheppard, and note 31 infra for the Sheppard "directive."
The Supreme Court's directive was picked up by the ABA Advisory Committee on Fair
Trial and Free Press, which made a tentative draft of recommended restrictions upon state-
ments for publication by lawyers engaged in criminal trials. See ADvISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR
TRIAl. AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited as
REARDON REPORT1. The REARDON REPORT was subsequently approved in large part as
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Approved Draft
1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PROJECT]. Two other Reports made similar recommenda-
tions. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO,
TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1967) [hereinafter cited as the MEDINA REPORTI; The Com-
mittee on the Operation of the Jury System, Judicial Conference of the United States, Report
of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue,
45 F.R.D. 391 (1968) [hereinafter cited as the Judicial Report]. It was from the recommenda-
tions of the ABA PROJECT and the Judicial Report that DR 7-107 was modeled and eventually
adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362 (4th Cir.
1979).
4. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 2, 82. Although DR 7-107 does not contain this specific
language, the Fourth Circuit has apparently interpreted DR 7-107 as if it did. See Hirschkop
v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362, 368 (4th Cir. 1979).
It should be noted that the prohibitions of DR 7-107 are very broad in scope; they apply to
jury and bench trials, civil and criminal litigation, and administrative and disciplinary pro-
ceedings. See the appendix to this comment.
5. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1154 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a per curiam opinion,
in Hirschkop v. Snead,' affirmed in part and reversed in part.7
The Fourth Circuit summarily rejected Hirschkop's contention that "the
first amendment precludes any rule limiting speech by lawyers."8 The
freedom of speech, the court stated, is not absolute; it may be subjected
to governmental restrictions if the restrictions satisfy the two-step test
formulated by Mr. Justice Powell in Procunier v. Martinez:9
First, the regulation. . . in question must further an important or substan-
tial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression ....
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved.' 0
The court held that there was "little question" that DR 7-107 satisfied
6. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979). The case was originally heard before a three judge panel
composed of Chief Judge Haynesworth, Judge Winter and Judge Butzner. Judge Butzner
prepared a proposed majority opinion of the panel, and the Chief Judge prepared a concurring
and dissenting opinion. A rehearing en banc was ordered after those two opinions had been
circulated but before they were filed. The per curiam opinion of the Fourth Circuit was
extracted in large part from those two opinions. Id. at 361.
7. Initially the Fourth Circuit had to consider whether Hirschkop had standing to maintain
his action even though no complaints charging violations of DR 7-107 were pending against
him as a result of the settlement agreement with the Virginia State Bar. See note 2, supra.
The court recognized that Hirschkop was licensed to practice law in Virginia and was, there-
fore, subject to discipline, including disbarment, for violations of DR 7-107. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 54-73 (Repl. Vol. 1978). In addition, the court noted that the settlement agreement
did not deal with the rule's constitutionality and it expressly provided that Hirschkop would
not be immune from disciplinary action in the future should he violate DR 7-107. The court
noted further that the Supreme Court had relaxed the traditional requirement for standing
in first amendment cases where a statute would cause not only litigants, but others not before
the court, to refrain from constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (constitutional attack on Oklahoma's Merit System Act restrict-
ing political activities by civil servants). Based on the relaxed rule for standing and the
particular facts in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that Hirschkop did have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of DR 7-107. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 363. See
generally Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1140 (action constituted a "case
or controversy").
8. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 363. See generally Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421
F. Supp. at 1143 (district court holding that Hirschkop's contention "flies in the face of right,
reason, logic, history-and the law. It weakens his whole case").
9. 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (involving prison mail censorship).
10. Id. at 413. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (balancing test required to restrict comments of lawyers
under DR 7-107). See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment,
72 YALE L.J. 877, 912 (1963) (discussing balancing test). See also 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 654,
660-61 (1976) (discussing balancing test used in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, supra).
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the first part of Martinez, since "[sitate and federal courts have a sub-
stantial interest in assuring every person the right to a fair trial . . . 'the
most fundamental of all freedoms.' "" The remaining issue before the court
was whether "the scope of the rule and the nature of its restrictions"
satisfied the second part of Martinez. '2 The resolution of this crucial issue,
the court concluded, required the application of the second part of
Martinez to each type of proceeding to which DR 7-107 referred. 3
II. CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS
With respect to criminal jury trials, the Fourth Circuit held that "a
properly drawn rule restricting lawyers' comments about pending criminal
prosecution [could] be justified by the need to protect the right to a fair
jury trial." 4 The court's starting premise was that "prejudice from lawyers'
unrestrained comments is most likely to occur in criminal cases heard by
a jury."'" Furthermore, the court was convinced that there was no less
intrusive means of assuring fair criminal jury trials than adopting rules to
prohibit extra-judicial statements by lawyers.' 6
11. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 363, quoting from Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965).
Judge Phillips, in his concurring opinion in Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 376, believed
that the dominant focus in the court's opinion on the substantial state interest of "assuring
every person the right to a fair trial," was too limited. He would have preferred defining the
state interest in broader terms: "protecting the integrity of certain essential judicial processes
that are critical in the adversary system." Id. For Judge Phillips, this broader definition of
the state's interest made the court's conclusion more compelling. Id. at 378.
12. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 365.
15. Id. at 364. The court was relying on the findings of the ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at
22, and of the Judicial Report, supra note 3, at 392. The court was also persuaded by the
expert testimony in the district court of the Honorable Bernard S. Meyer, who was a member
of the Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press which drafted the REARDON REPORT,
supra note 3. Judge Meyer's testimony, based primarily on the findings of the REARDON
REPORT, disclosed that prejudicial publicity posed a substantial threat to a fair criminal jury
trial. Judge Meyer also testified that the drafters of the REARDON REPORT had relied heavily
on the Supreme Court's mandate in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966), directing
courts to adopt rules to assure a fair trial. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364. See note 30
infra for a discussion of Sheppard, and note 31 infra for the Sheppard "directive."
16. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 365. The alternative techniques available to the court
included: (1) exclusion of public from those hearings during trial held in absence of jury; (2)
continuance; (3) change of venue; (4) waiver of jury; (5) searching voir dire; (6) selection of
jury from locality outside of area of intensive news coverage; (7) sequestration of jury; (8)
admonitions to jury to avoid news reports relating to trial; (9) cautionary instructions to
media regarding critical matters; (10) examination of jurors regarding possible exposure to
prejudicial information during trial; (11) mistrial; (12) new trial. See REARDON REPORT, supra
note 3, at 73-74.
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Upon concluding that the adoption of a rule such as DR 7-107 in criminal
jury trials was not "unnecessarily broad" in theory,' 7 the more controver-
sial issue facing the court was whether the specific restrictions of DR 7-
107 on statements by lawyers regarding pending criminal jury trials in
which they were involved, were "essential to the preservation of a fair
trial."'" The parties in this action were sharply divided over what com-
ments should be barred. Hirschkop argued that a properly drawn rule
could bar only those statements that present a "clear and present danger
to a fair trial."' 9 Counsel for the Virginia Supreme Court urged, however,
The Fourth Circuit rejected Hirschkop's suggestion that the judge could protect the rights
of the accused by entering "gag orders" on an ad hoc basis, since prejudicial information is
likely to be released during the investigatory stages of the case before the charges against the
accused come to the attention of the judge. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 365. See Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), in which the Supreme Court emphasized that courts
must take measures in advance to "prevent the prejudice at its inception." Id. at 363. Cf.
REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 25-26, in which the Committee concluded that the likeli-
hood of prejudicial information reaching the public during the investigatory stage was rela-
tively low.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the argument that other remedial measures such as change
of venue, continuances and searching voir dire were effective alternatives. The court stated
that the use of such tools might impinge upon other constitutional rights of the accused, such
as the right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the accused might so doubt the impartiality of the
jury that he may feel compelled to waive his right to trial by jury. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d at 367. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (accused
might be forced to waive jury trial because of pretrial publicity).
The court did consider, however, the high fiduciary duty of the lawyer to the court and to
the public as a substantial reason for imposing rules on the publication of information by
lawyers. Lawyers, as officers of the court, have a duty to protect and preserve the right to a
fair trial, the court stated. If lawyers release information adversely affecting that right, the
court held that they should be subject to disciplinary sanctions. The court rejected the notion
that such rules reduced lawyers to second-class citizens. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 366.
17. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364, quoting from Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,
413 (1974).
18. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364-65. DR 7-107 breaks down the categories of pend-
ing criminal litigation into four time sequences and enumerates specific restrictions for each
time sequence. First, DR 7-107(A) applies to the investigatory period prior to arrest. Second,
DR 7-107(B) and (C) apply to the time from arrest until the commencement of the trial or
the disposition without trial. Third, DR 7-107(D) applies to the trial stage. And fourth, DR
7-107(E) applies to the post-trial stage prior to sentencing. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
374-76; appendix to this comment.
19. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 365. Hirschkop was relying in large part on Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom Cunningham
v. Chicago Council of Lawyers, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). In Chicago Council, the only other case
involving the constitutionality of DR 7-107, the Seventh Circuit held that "[o]nly those
comments that pose a [serious and imminent threat] of interference with the fair adminis-
tration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed." Id. at 249, quoting from its earlier
decisions in In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1971), and Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d
1979]
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that DR 7-107 should be read as prohibiting only "those comments which
are reasonably likely to interfere with the administration of justice. 2 0
At the outset, the court noted that the express prohibiLions of DR 7-107
were not explicitly qualified by either a "reasonable likelihood" or a "clear
and present danger" standard. Apparently, the court stated, the drafters
of the "no-comment rule" concluded that the potential for prejudice to the
accused's right to a fair trial was so inherent and so great in the areas
proscribed under DR 7-107 that no qualification was necessary. 2' Neverthe-
less, the court, agreeing with counsel for the Virginia Supreme Court, held
that the drafters of DR 7-107 were concerned only with speech that had a
"reasonable likelihood of interference with a fair trial," and that it did not
strain the language of the rule to read such a qualification as implicit in
each of its express prohibitions.22 Moreover, the court was satisfied that the
1059, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1970). In In re Oliver, the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court's
adoption of a blanket prohibition, prospective in nature, against all comments by lawyers in
cases tried before a judge or jury and without regard to whether such comments posed a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice, was violative of the first amend-
ment. In Chase, the Seventh Circuit held that "gag orders" on comments of defense attorneys
and their clients violated their first amendment rights unless the record contained sufficient
facts showing that their comments would cause a serious and imminent threat to the adminis-
tration of justice. For a discussion of Chicago Council, supra, see 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 654
(1976).
The Supreme Court has apparently construed the "clear and present danger" and "serious
and imminent danger" terminology as interchangeable, meaning essentially the same thing.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (appeal from conviction under Ohio
Criminal Syndicalism Statute); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1945) (contempt
of court proceeding for publishing articles and cartoons critical of judges); Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252, 262 n.5 (1941) (contempt of court proceeding for publishing comments
about pending litigation).
20. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 365. The Virginia Supreme Court wanted DR 7-107
to be read consistently with its prototype found in the ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 2, 82,
even though DR 7-107 does not contain that specific language. See generally United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (involving con-
tempt conviction for violation by defendants of court imposed "gag order"); Younger v.
Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 157-64, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238-42 (1973) (involving contempt
conviction for violation by lawyers of court imposed "gag orders"). Both Tijerina and Younger
held that the "reasonable likelihood" standard suffices constitional scrutiny, and that the
Supreme Court has never required a "clear and present danger" to the right to a fair trial,
before the court may restrict extrajudicial comments by the participants.
21. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 365, 376.
22. Id. at 368. The court was particularly impressed with the assurances of the Virginia
Supreme Court that it so construed and would enforce DR 7-107. Id. Cf. Hirschkop v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1154-56 (DR 7-107 construed as general rule explained by specific
examples intended as mere guidelines). But cf. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 84-85 (no-
comment rule states specific restrictions).
The court did not address itself to Hirschkop's contention that DR 7-107 was unconstitu-
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Constitution did not require a tighter standard than that implicit in the
rule itself.?
The court stated further that, from a practical standpoint, the reasona-
ble likelihood standard was more appropriate under DR 7-107 than was the
clear and present danger standard because the threat sought to be pre-
vented was not the present danger or the imminent harm, but rather the
potential danger of prejudice to a fair trial. 4 The court noted that should
a prosecutor make a pretrial release of a confession given by the accused,
the reasonable likelihood test would be met since there would be a possibil-
ity of prejudice to the accused if the confession were subsequently sup-
pressed and held inadmissible. But because the confession could be de-
clared admissible at trial, there would be present only a potential danger
at the time of the release and not an immediate threat to the right to a
fair trial.? For this reason, the court doubted whether a clear and present
danger test would ever be met. In fact, the court believed that a clear and
present danger standard would only cast confusion, rather than clarity, on
the speech prohibited by the no-comment rule. 26
tionally vague. But one could argue that the court's own analysis makes out a prima facie
case of vagueness, since no express standard is contained in the rule, requiring the court to
look outside the rule for the appropriate standard, and even then there were two conflicting
views on what that standard should be. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972) (regulations on conduct are "void for vagueness" if their prohibitions are not
clearly defined); Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (vagueness attack on loyalty oaths
of certain state employees as a condition of employment); Amsterdam, The Void-for-
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960); 7 CONN. L. REv. 94
(1974).
23. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 368. Thus, the Fourth Circuit has rejected the "serious
and imminent threat" test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council, supra note
19. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 362, 370. See generally Hirschkop v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1156 (Virginia Supreme Court's construction of DR 7-107 held consistent
with constitutional requirements).
Moreover, the court was of the opinion that the only reason for any qualification at all was
to take care of the extraordinary case in which there was no likelihood of a prejudicial effect.
For example, if James Earle Ray should again escape from prison, the court believed that no
substantial right of Ray would be adversely affected if the prosecutor should release that Ray
was serving a sentence for the murder of Martin Luther King, since that is a widely known
fact. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 367.
24. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 368.
25. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the court should have the power to censure such
reprehensible and irresponsible conduct by the prosecutor immediately, and should not have
to wait until the threatened harm was clear and present. Id.
26. Id. at 368. The court noted that if the "clear and present danger" test was, in fact, met
in this situation, then the issue before the court was only a matter of semantics and not a
matter of constitutional doctrine. Id. at n.13.
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The Fourth Circuit also tried to distinguish the prohibitions under DR
7-107 from other situations which have traditionally invoked the height-
ened scrutiny of the clear and present danger test. First, the court held that
DR 7-107 did not constitute a prior restraint on the speech of lawyers, since
one prosecuted for violating the rule could challenge its validity, and could
be sanctioned for the violation only after he had been afforded a due
process hearing and found guilty.2 In addition, the court distinguished the
restrictions under DR 7-107 from the subversive acts cases which involved
''pure" first amendment rights rather than a conflict between first and
sixth amendment rights.2 Lastly, the court stated that DR 7-107 was dis-
tinguishable from those cases involving contempt convictions against the
press for publishing critical articles and cartoons about the court, since the
no-comment rule applies only to lawyers and is quite explicit in informing
them of proscribed areas of speech.29
And finally, in reaching its determination that the reasonable likelihood
standard was the appropriate test under DR 7-107, the Fourth Circuit
27. Id. at 368-69. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248-49 (holding that
even though DR 7-107 did not constitute a prior restraint, it did have some inherent features
of prior restraint, thus requiring close scrutiny); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp.
at 1152 (DR 7-107 is not a prior restraint).
Prior restraints are usually imposed by a judicial decree, violations of which are summarily
punishable by the contempt powers of the court without the traditional due process safe-
guards. As a general rule prior restraints may not be challenged as unconstitutional if there
is an opportunity for appeal. See Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 248-49. See generally Walker
v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (petitioners may not disobey injunctions where
there is opportunity for orderly judicial review).
28. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 369. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372
(1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (clear and present danger test stated to be a
prerequisite in a prosecution under California's Criminal Syndicalism Statute); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Mr. Justice Holmes formulating the clear and present
danger standard as the test for prosecutions under the Federal Espionage Act of 1917).
29. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 369. Accord, Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F.
Supp. at 1149-50. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 369 (1947) (involving a reversal of
contempt convictions of a newspaper publisher, reporter and editorial writer for publishing
articles and editorials criticizing a guilty verdict in a forcible detainer case); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (involving a reversal of a contempt conviction for publishing
highly critical editorials and cartoons about certain judges); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941) (involving a reversal of contempt conviction for publishing editorials regarding a
particular case, but after conviction).
One commentator has suggested that these cases involving contempt convictions against
the press can be distinguished from cases involving DR 7-107 for three reasons: (1) all of these
cases involved representatives of the press and not officers of the court; (2) none of the
extrajudicial publications in question related to litigation pending at the time the statements
were published; and (3) these cases were based on the court's contempt power rather than
on its rule-making power. 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 654, 662 (1976).
220 [Vol. 14:213
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relied heavily upon Sheppard v. Maxwell,30 in which the Supreme Court
stated that, "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news
will prevent a fair trial," the trial judge must take remedial action.3' The
court recognized that this statement was made with reference to actions
the judge must take to remedy the situation after the harm has been
done.32 Nevertheless, the court noted that the Supreme Court also directed
courts to "take such steps by rule and regulation" that will "prevent the
prejudice at its inception. '3  The court concluded that if remedial action
must be taken on the basis of a reasonable likelihood test, the rules to
prevent the harm initially must be formulated under the same test . 3 Thus,
the court determined that the Supreme Court had tacitly approved of the
reasonable likelihood test in Sheppard.3 5
30. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The Sheppard trial represents one of the major atrocities of the
American legal system. Dr. Sam Sheppard, who was charged with murdering his wife, was
the subject of pervasive incriminating pretrial publicity. He was questioned for more than
five hours without counsel in a televised inquest; newspapers emphasized his failure to take
a lie detector test and published a picture of the alleged bloodstained pillow; his extra-marital
love affairs were exploited; headlines demanded his arrest and denounced his innocence; the
names and addresses of prospective jurors were published, causing them to receive telephone
calls regarding the case. During the trial, the judge and prosecutor were candidates for
judgeships in the midst of heated campaigns; the press was given free rein in the small
courtroom; they were even assigned seats inside the bar; they hounded Dr. Sheppard and
caused frequent confusion in and around the courtroom. During their sequestered delibera-
tions, jurors were permitted to make unsupervised telephone calls. Ultimately, Dr. Sheppard
was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court granted Sam Sheppard a writ of habeas corpus
on the grounds that he had been deprived of his right to a fair trial. Id. at 363.
31. Id. Since the so-called Sheppard "mandate" or "directive" is controversial and subject
to varying interpretations when taken out of context, it is reprinted here in its entirety.
But where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will
prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or
transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity. In addition, sequestra-
tion of the jury was something the judge should have raised sua sponte with counsel.
If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should
be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused,
witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the
court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and
the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject
to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
Id. at 363.
32. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 369.
33. Id. at 369-70. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363. See note 31 supra.
34. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 370.
35. Id. But cf. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156-57, 159, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237,
239 (1973) (stating that "snippets" from Sheppard are inconclusive as to which stan-
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For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit held that the specific prohibitions
of DR 7-107, based upon the reasonable likelihood standard, constituted
the least intrusive means of "assuring every person the right to a fair trial"
in criminal cases tried before a jury. 6
Judge Winter and Judge Butzner dissented from the part of the per
curiam opinion approving restrictions on lawyers' comments that did not
pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of a criminal jury trial. 7
The two judges agreed with the fundamental precepts of the majority, that
"the governmental interest in fair jury trials of criminal cases and the lack
of less restrictive means for achieving this end, justify the promulgation
of a rule restricting the comments that a lawyer may make for publica-
tion."38 They disagreed with the majority, however, over the applicable
standard for such a rule. And they also disagreed that the applicable
standard for restricting lawyers' comments could be found in Sheppard v.
Maxwell.3"
dard-reasonable likelihood or clear and present danger-is applicable to fair trial-free press
issue).
36. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 370. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that with respect
to criminal jury trials DR 7-107 satisfied the second part of Martinez, supra notes 9-13,
requiring that restrictions on speech must be "no greater than [are] necessary or essential"
to protect the governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974).
In a final matter regarding criminal jury trials, the court held that DR 7-107(D), which
prohibits statements about "other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial," was "void for vagueness." Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 370-71. Accord Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 255-56. The Fourth Circuit stated that "[tihis
proscription is so imprecise that it can be a trap for the unwary ... neither the speaker nor
the disciplinarian is instructed where to draw the line between what is permissible and what
is forbidden." Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972) (regulations on conduct are "void for vagueness" if their prohibitions are not
clearly defined); Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (vagueness attack on loyalty oaths
of certain state employees as a condition of employment). See generally Amsterdam, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); 7 CONN. L.
REv. 94 (1974).
37. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 378-79 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing). Judge Winter and Judge Butzner joined in that portion of the per curiam opinion
reversing the district court and dissented from that part affirming it. For this reason they
would have remanded the case for a declaratory judgment that DR 7-107 was unconstitutional
in its entirety. Id.
38. Id. at 381. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text. See generally Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363 (1966).
39. 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 379. Cf. Younger v. Smith,
30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973) (Sheppard is inconclusive as to what is the
proper standard). But cf. note 31 supra and accompanying text (proper standard can be found
in Sheppard).
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Judge Winter and Judge Butzner pointed out that the Supreme Court,
in Sheppard, did not explicitly approve of the reasonable likelihood test
for limiting lawyers' comments in all cases." In fact, they noted that the
Supreme Court was not addressing the first amendment implications of
such a rule." For this reason, the judges concluded that it was doubtful
that the Supreme Court would implicitly approve of a shift from the clear
and present danger test to a reasonable likelihood standard.2 Furthermore,
Judge Winter and Judge Butzner suggested that the reasonable likelihood
standard of Sheppard was not suitable for determining the parameter of
lawyers' first amendment rights. 3 The reasonable likelihood test, they
stated, was retrospective in nature, formulated for the purpose of gauging
whether adverse publicity had denied a defendant due process. DR 7-107,
on the other hand, was prospective in nature, designed to inform lawyers
in advance of permissible areas of speech. Because lawyers frequently do
not know the impact their remarks will have, Judge Winter and Judge
Butzner believed that the reasonable likelihood standard would cause law-
yers to speculate whether their remarks may at some later date be judged
to have created a reasonable likelihood of prejudice because of contingen-
cies they did not foresee. The inevitable result of this type of speculative
standard, the judges argued, is that lawyers will take the "prudent
course," avoiding all comment no matter how remote the chance of preju-
dice at the time."
Judge Winter and Judge Butzner were more of the opinion that the
proper standard to be applied to DR 7-107 could be found in the traditional
line of authority resolving the conflict between the first amendment and
other important governmental interests.45 They cited as the leading case
in this area Schenck v. United States,4" in which Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent. It is a question of proximity and degree. 7
40. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 380 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing). See Sheppard "mandate" note 31 supra.
41. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 380 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Judge Winter and Judge Butzner cited the particular facts in this case as indicative
of the rule's present effect. See note 2 supra.
45. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 379 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing).
46. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See generally note 28 supra.
47. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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Although the judges recognized that the clear and present danger standard
has not provided a ready answer in every situation," they believed it had
provided a working principle to protect freedom of speech. 9 This opinion
was buttressed by a trilogy of Supreme Court decisions5" rejecting a lesser
standard than "clear and present danger" for imposing restrictions on
speech regarding pending litigation. In Bridges v. California,51 which was
affirmed by Pennekamp v. Florida2 and Craig v. Harney,53 the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that the difference between the "reasonable like-
lihood" and the "clear and present danger" standards was nothing more
than a futile exercise in semantics." Moreover, the judges stated that
Bridges had disposed of the argument that for a temporary restriction on
speech a less rigorous test was required. 5
Finally, Judge Winter and Judge Butzner expressed the opinion that,
though lawyers are officers of the court, this did not justify a different
standard for measuring their first amendment rights, thereby reducing
them to second class citizenry. Thus, Judge Winter and Judge Butzner
48. See Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 240, stating: "The 'clear and present danger'
test never has been the universal solvent of First Amendment problems which it is popularly
thought to be." See generally Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to
Dennis, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger:"
From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 52-55; Note, The Clear
and Present Danger Standard: Its Present Viability, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1971). See also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608-17 (1978).
49. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 379 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing).
50. See note 29 supra.
51. Supra note 29.
52. Supra note 29, at 334-35.
53. Supra note 29, at 371-72. See generally Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978) (affirming "clear and present danger" test of Bridges while reversing
publisher's conviction under Virginia law prohibiting the divulging of identification of a judge
who was the subject of investigation by Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (using clear and present danger test to reverse sheriffs contempt
conviction for criticizing racious activity of pending grand jury).
54. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941). Cf. note 25 supra (might be only a
matter of semantics).
55. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 269. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 379-80
(Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissenting). But cf. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar,
421 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (temporarily muting lawyers' "important but relatively insubstan-
tial" right to free speech is outweighed by need to protect right to fair trial).
56. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 381 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissent-
ing). See generally Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (lawyers cannot be disbarred for
exercising right against self-incrimination in disciplinary hearing); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (state may not impose unemployment eligibility requirements so as to make
worker abandon freedom of religion).
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concluded that DR 7-107 did not meet constitutional requirements, as it
imposed restrictions on lawyers' comments that did not pose a clear and
present danger to a fair criminal jury trial.57
In essence, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that, to adequately and
efficiently protect the right to a fair criminal jury trial and to assure the
due administration of justice, rules must be adopted proscribing, at some
point, the extrajudicial comments of both prosecutors and defense attor-
neys. One of the significant features of the Hirschkop decision is its illus-
tration of the two conflicting views regarding the point at which the speech
of lawyers must give way to the right to a fair trial, the majority of the court
adopting the "reasonable likelihood of interference" standard, and Judge
Winter and Judge Butzner advocating the "clear and present danger of
interference" standard. The question that remains unanswered throughout
both opinions, however, is why should DR 7-107 apply to defense attorneys
at all. Since the Fourth Circuit avoided this question, it might be useful
to examine it at some length here. 58
The apparent source of the application of DR 7-107 to both prosecutors
57. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 381. Accord Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d at 249-51.
Judge Winter and Judge Butzner also noted that the ABA had recognized that "the reason-
able likelihood test [was] too relaxed to provide full protection to the first amendment
interests of attorneys," and had revised its 1968 standard, which was the prototype for DR 7-
107. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 381 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissenting),
quoting from ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTIcE, FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 8-1.1, at 3 (Tent. Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS
1978].
The new ABA standard proscribes only a lawyer's dissemination of information that "would
pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial." ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra, at
1. The revision was prompted, first, by a recognition that the first amendment implications
of the reasonable likelihood standard had received only cursory discussion in the REARDON
REPORT, supra note 3, at 93. ABA STANDARD 1978, supra, at 2. Secondly, the revision was
required as a result of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Council, supra note 19,
holding that a "serious and imminent threat" standard was required by the first amendment.
ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra, at 1-3. And lastly, but most importantly, the First Edition failed
to recognize that extrajudicial statements by lawyers in criminal trials do not inevitably affect
the fairness of the trial. Id. at 4.
58. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 367-68, where the court analyzed the threat that
statements by prosecutors have on the defendant's right to a fair trial, thus, necessitating
the barring of those statements by DR 7-107(B). However, the court's opinion is devoid of
similar analysis with respect to defense attorneys. Cf. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d at 250-51, where the Seventh Circuit expressed its "disquietude" over barring com-
ments by defense attorneys, but nevertheless, believed that it was constitutionally permissa-
ble to protect "public justice, [a] no less important [interest] than an accused's right to a
fair trial."
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and defense attorneys can be traced to Sheppard v. Maxwell,59 in which
the Supreme Court stated:
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel
for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers com-
ing under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function. Collaboration between counsel and the press as to information
affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but
is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures."
The major problem with the Supreme Court's directive regarding de-
fense counsel is that it far exceeded the appropriate scope of the Court's
decision.61 The' issue before the Court was whether Dr. Sheppard had been
denied due process as a result of the trial judge's failure to take sufficient
measures to prevent the "carnival atmosphere" surrounding the trial.
12
The evidence showed that the bulk of the pretrial publicity was prosecu-
tion oriented, and there was no evidence suggesting that Dr. Sheppard's
lawyer generated publicity prejudicial to the prosecution.3 The appropri-
ate scope of the holding in Sheppard, then, can be found in the following
language:
59. Supra note 30 and 31. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 251;
Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and De-
fense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. Rrv. 607, 610 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Freedman & Starwood]. The Freedman & Starwood article was critical
of dictum in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S 539, 564 n. 8 (1976) (disapproving prior
restraints on press), suggesting that the least drastic alternative for preserving the right to a
fair trial was "gagging" the participants, including the defendant and his attorney, rather
than imposing prior restraints on the press. See Freedman & Starwood, supra, at 607-13.
Although the article did not deal exclusively with DR 7-107, see id. at 608, its criticism is
instructive and analogical to the discussion here.
60. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added). See generally Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 n. 8 (1975) (condoning Sheppard dicta); id. at 601 n. 27
(Brennan, J., concurring) (dicta to same effect).
61. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 610.
62. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363, where the Supreme Court granted a reversal
on the grounds that the "trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the
inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive
influences in the courtroom." See generally Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 610-11.
63. There was evidence, however, showing that Dr. Sheppard's lawyer attempted to
counter adverse publicity and to create a favorable climate for his client, see REARDON REPORT,
supra note 3, at 42-43, but the only suggestion that defense oriented publicity prejudiced the
prosecution was in unsupported dictum, where the Supreme Court stated "that many of the
prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution, as well as the defense." Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 361. See generally Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 611 n. 28,
stating: "Given the posture of the case and the attitude of the press toward the defendant,
such efforts [to influence the public] were doomed to failure."
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Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free
from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications
and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the
jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance
is never weighed against the accused."
Thus, the Supreme Court's mandate with respect to defense attorneys was
ill-advised dictum, providing a shaky foundation for the application of no-
comment rules, such as DR 7-107, to attorneys for the defense.
Furthermore, it is yet to be seen whether DR 7-107 can pass constitu-
tional muster when scrutinized solely on the basis of its silencing of defense
attorneys.65 When extrajudicial statements of defense attorneys are prohib-
ited, the interest sought to be protected is no longer the right of the accused
to a fair trial;"6 rather, defense attorneys are silenced to protect the govern-
ment's interest in the "fair administration of justice.""7 This amorphous
phrase apparently applies collectively to the state's interest in a fair trial,"
public justice, 9 and the preservation of the integrity of the judicial pro-
cesses.70 But the "fears of defense-generated publicity" ignores the
"truism" that the Constitution protects the rights of the individual from
the state, and not the reverse.7 Seemingly, courts and commentators have
reasoned backwards with regard to DR 7-107.
This point can be illustrated as follows: the right of "the accused" to a
"public trial, by an impartial jury" is expressly protected by the sixth
amendment; his right to "due process" or fairness is expressly protected
64. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added). See Freedman & Starwood,
supra note 59, at 611. See also note 31 supra (Sheppard mandate), and note 62 supra (grounds
for reversal).
65. See note 58 supra.
66. See notes 72-76 infra and accompanying text.
67. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 362 ("fair administration of justice"). See also
REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
68. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (government has a legitimate
interest in a fair trial); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert, denied,
396 U.S. 990 (1969) ("concept of a fair trial applies both to the prosecution and the defense");
State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A. 2d 841, 852 (1964) ("right of the state to a fair
trial cannot be impeded or diluted by out-of-court assertions" by defense or prosecution).
69. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 ("public justice is no
less important than an accused's right to a fair trial").
70. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 376 (Phillips, J., concurring) (state interest
"in protecting the integrity of certain essential judicial processes that are critical in the
adversary system").
71. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 607-08. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 (fifth and sixth amendments protect the accused and not the govern-
ment).
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by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The prosecutor's first amend-
ment right to free speech will inevitably conflict at some point with these
constitutio)nally guaranteed rights of the accused,12 requiring that the pros-
ecutor's right give way.73 However, the government's interest in the due
administration of justice is not constitutionally protected. 4 As one court
has said, "[the Sixth Amendment speaks only of the right of an accused
and the Fifth Amendment only of the right of persons and not of the
government.."15 Thus, on a constitutional level there is no conflict between
the defense attorney's first amendment right to free speech and the govern-
ment's interest in a fair trial that would necessitate that the former give
way to the latter.7 1
This is not to suggest that the defense lawyer's right to free speech is
absolute, as Hirschkop contended before the Fourth Circuit;7 it is not.
Nevertheless, for the government to restrict the speech of defense attor-
neys, there must be a showing of a compelling governmental interest,
which is furthered by the least restrictive alternative.76
72. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248 ("irreconcilable con-
flicts do arise" between the first and sixth amendments).
73. The rights protected by the first and sixth amendments have never been ranked in
hierarchical fashion, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 661 (1976), but the
general view is that the prosecutor's first amendment right to free speech must give way to
the accused's right to a fair trial when they conflict. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
at 363-70; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 248; Hirschkop v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1143-56.
Freedman and Starwood state that the comments of the prosecutor, as representations of
the state, are also limited by the requirements of the due process clauses in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 617.
See generally Comment, Silence Orders-Preserving Political Expression by Defendants
and Their Lawyers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 595 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Silence
Orders] (criticizing imposition of no-comment orders on defendants and their attorneys,
particularly in cases involving politically motivated defenses). The comment states that the
prosecutor's interest in a fair trial is 'to seek justice, not merely to convict."' Id. at 600,
quoting from ABA, The Prosecution Function, in STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25 (Tent.
Draft 1970). Thus, the comment argues that there is no conflict between silencing the prose-
cution and its interest in a trial. Silence Orders, supra at 600.
74. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 607-08.
75. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2"d at 250 (emphasis added). See generally
Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 608, where the decision in Chicago Council is
criticized for elevating "public justice" to a constitutionally protected status on par with the
accused's fifth and sixth amendment rights to a fair trial.
76. See Freedman and Starwood, supra note 59, at 612 n.35. But cf. the authority cited in
notes 68-70 supra.
77. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 363; note 8 supra.
78. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text. Although the Fourth Circuit performed
the traditional balancing test in Hirschkop v. Snead, it did so only with respect to prosecutors
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First, concerning the element of compelling governmental interest, it
should not be assumed that the government's interest in the due adminis-
tration of justice is any more compelling than defense counsel's right to
freedom of speech. The source of the defense attorney's right to freedom
of expression is two-fold: first, he has an individual right to freedom of
speech and, second, just as importantly, he has an interest based on his
"role as the defendant's champion against a 'hostile world.' , Respecting
the defense lawyer's individual right, since he is often regarded as the most
credible and knowledgeable source of information and opinion with respect
to pending litigation in which he is associated, there is often-times an acute
need to allow his unrefrained speech. A case in which he is involved may
demonstrate the necessity fcr reform in our legal system."0 In addition, he
serves an important watchdog function against police and government
abuse and the miscarriage of justice in the case in which he is involved 8 '
It has been argued that the defense lawyer's right to free speech is not
actually infringed by the proscriptions of DR 7-107, but is merely post-
poned until after the final disposition of the trial." But such "moratoria
on public discussion . .. [cannot] be dismissed as an insignificant
abridgment of freedom of expression."" Moreover, this argument fails to
and not with respect to defense attorneys. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 366-68. See
also note 58 supra.
79. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 614.
80. Id. at 616. Relying on the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY, EC 8-I (1975),
Freedman and Starwood state that the attorney has an affirmative professional duty to urge
improvement in the legal system, at least insofar as trial publicity is consistent with his
client's specific interests. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 616 n.59. See Silence
Orders, supra note 73, at 601 (defendants and their attorneys are the best source of relevant
information).
81. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250 (lawyers involved in trials
are often in position to act as a check on government by exposing abuses or urging action);
Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 616 (duty of defense lawyer to speak out publicly
about injustices in case); Silence Orders, supra note 73, at 601-02 (watchdog function in
scrutinizing action in indicting political dissidents). Cf. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 370
(DR 7-107(C) (11) would permit lawyer to state that statute under which his client was
charged was unconstitutional). But cf. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1146-
47 (injustice of statute is issue to be decided in court and not in public).
Freedman and Starwood also note that a lawyer may have a substantial interst in going
public to set the record straight when he is "the subject of well-publicized personal attacks
as a result of representing an unpopular client or cause." Freedman & Starwood, supra note
59, at 616.
82. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1146-47 (comments by
lawyer cannot be so vital that they cannot await the end of the case); Cole & Spaks, Defense
Counsel and the First Amendment; A Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, 6 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 347, 378 n. 163 (1974).
83. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941). See Hirsckop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 379-
1979]
230 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:213
recognize the often immediate need for the action urged by the lawyer, and
the fact that public attention often can be compelled only during the
pendency of the litigation. 4 It has also been contended that the defense
attorney, as an officer of the court, has a duty to remain silent during the
litigation.85 This "[w]ith privilege . . .goes responsibility" argument
proves too much."6 It is too late in the day to deny that "[l]awyers also
enjoy first-class citizenship,"" or to argue that speech of defense attorneys
may be balanced on a different scale.
As noted above, the defense lawyer also has a special interest in speech
emanating from his position as the professional advocate of the accused."
As one commentator"9 has noted:
[C]ircumstances will virtually never occur in which the right to freedom of
speech could be of more importance to an individual than in the course of
criminal proceedings. The prosecutor is privileged to publish to the
world-including the defendant's family, friends, neighbors, and business
associates-what in almost any other context would constitute libel per se.10
It may take some time for the accused to refute the heinous allegations in
the indictment and releases to the press; and even then, the aura of mis-
80 (Winter & Butzner, JJ., concurring and dissenting); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d at 250; Silence Orders, supra note 73, at 601.
84. See note 83 supra.
85. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (lawyer's
duty to obey ethical precepts may require him to abstain from otherwise constitutionally
protected speech); Id. at 666 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (lawyer involved in criminal trial
"is not merely a person and not even merely a lawyer"); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 366
(lawyers enjoy many privileges others do not; with privilege goes responsibility of not speaking
during pending litigation); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1147-48 (as
members of bar, lawyers are "extraordinary citizens," subject to greater restrictions on their
freedom of speech). See generally 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 654, 672-76 (1976) (criticizing Chicago
Council for not focusing on fact that no-comment rules are directed specifically and exclu-
sively toward lawyers as officers of court, who are subject to ethical limitations on speech).
86. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 366. See note 85 supra.
87. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967) (held that lawyer may not be disbarred for
exercising his right to remain silent at disciplinary hearing). See note 56 supra.
88. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
89. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59.
90. Id. at 613. The authors also note that in one important respect, the prosecutor's right
of expression is much broader than that of other citizens since he can publish charges in an
indictment that might otherwise constitute defamation or libel. Id. at 617. For cases demon-
strating the extraordinary privilege of expression possessed by the prosecutor, see, e.g., Mur-
phy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 30; Rideau v. Louisiana,
supra note 3; Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181
(1952); United States ex rel Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
916 (1963); REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-46.
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deeds may persist." It is doubtful, though, that the often-times unsophisti-
cated and inarticulate voice of the defendant will be heard.2 Indeed, he
may be disbelieved. 3 As a practical matter, moreover, the defendant may
never have access to the press. All of these reasons point to the need for
the "champion" of the accused to speak for him. 5
It appears to be the fear of many critics that the unadulterated speech
of the defense attorney may run counter to the interests of his client. The
ABA Project suggests that speech "which enhances the prominence of the
attorney may well result in prejudice to the client.""9 It is difficult to
respond to this assertion, as it is supported by a dearth of authority.
Suffice it to say, then, that for those seriously concerned about this conflict
in interest, other provisions of the Disciplinary Rules appear to be readily
adapted to deal with the problem."
91. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250; Freedman & Starwood,
supra note 59, at 613.
92. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at-250; Freedman & Starwood,
supra note 59, at 614.
93. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250:
Only slight reflection is needed to realize that the scales of justice in the eyes of the
public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against an accused after his indictment. A
bare denial and a possible reminder that a charged person is presumed to be innocent
until proved guilty is often insufficient to balance the scales.
See also Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 611; Silence Orders, supra note 73, at 600.
94. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 614, noting that accused is often either
without bail or the means to pay it, thus, excluding him from access to the press.
It has also been suggested that the accused might seriously damage his case if he were
forced to deal personally with the press on his own behalf. Id. at n.46 and accompanying text.
95. Two other reasons have been suggested for allowing the defense attorney to go public:
(1) to raise defense funds and (2) to secure witnesses. Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29
STAN. L. REv. 621, 625 n.13 (1977). Contra, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
at 254 (judicial system has adequate solution for defendants without funds).
96. ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 20. Accord, Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F.
Supp. at 1142 (stating that public relations campaigns by cult of lawyers seeking nationwide
notoriety are "more often for the pecuniary and ego benefit of the lawyer and at the expense
of the best interests of his client").
97. Cf. United States ex rel Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 374 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963) (murder conviction reversed because jury failed to meet standards of impari-
ality). The Second Circuit expressly held that, even though the defense attorney contributed
to the pretrial publicity by publicizing his client's defense of insanity, there was no evidence
that the attorney was disloyal or incompetent. Id. at 373. But cf. id. at 378 (dissenting
opinion), stating that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial since the bulk of prejudi-
cial publicity was attributable to the defense.
98. See, e.g., DR 5-101(A) which provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment
on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business,
property, or personal interests," and DR 7-101 (A) which provides in part: "A lawyer shall not
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The major concern with defense-generated publicity is, however, that it
may severely prejudice the prosecution's case." Assuming, arguendo, that
the governmental interest in the due administration of justice is compel-
ling, it is yet to be seen whether the application of DR 7-107 to defense
attorneys constitutes the least restrictive means for furthering that inter-
est. The answer to this can be found by analyzing the nature and extent
of the fair trial-free press issue.
In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court noted in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart' that "[in the overwhelming majority of criminal
trials, pretrial publicity presents few unmanageable threats to [a fair
trial]. '"' Rather, it is only in the sensational cases that tensions develop
between a fair trial and free speech.' In fact, in many cases in which the
intentionally: . .. (3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional
relationship." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1975). See generally Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93 (1976) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (presumption that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the court and his
client, and that court is not justified in limiting lawyer's opportunity to serve his client
because of fears that he may disserve the legal system by violating accepted ethical stan-
dards); Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 616 (suggesting after-the-fact sanctions when
necessary are less restrictive means of dealing with this problem).
It has also been contended that another reason for restricting extrajudicial statements of
the defense attorney is because the prosecutor is already at a disadvantage since the defen-
dant is free to speak out in his defense. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 20. This contention
has been thoroughly dispensed with above. See notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1971); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137
(E.D. Va. 1976); ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 20 ("state's right to a fair trial can be seriously
threatened by defense counsel").
100. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
101. Id. at 551. Accord Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364. See ABA STANDARDS 1978,
supra note 57, in which it was stated: with regard to extrajudicial statements by lawyers:
"[Wihile such statements might undermine trial fairness, it is by no means inevitable.
Indeed, in the vast majority of criminal cases, extrajudicial statements by trial attorneys have
no impact at all. The failure to take full account of this consideration is the central weakness
of the [ABA PROJECT]." Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
102. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 551. Accord Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
at 364. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
540 (1965) (reversing defendant's swindling conviction because defendant was denied due
process as a result of televising his highly publicized trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,
727 (1963) (denial of change of venue by trial judge after confession of accused to sheriff had
been repeatedly televised in area from which jurors were to be drawn, held denial of due
process); Irwin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (where .eight of twelve jurors had stated in
voir dire their belief that accused was guilty, held jury did not meet constitutional standard
of impartiality); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 311-13 (1959) (where jurors were
exposed to newspaper article containing information trial judge had held inadmissable, held
that defendant had been denied due process); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION
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defendant has been the subject of pervasive adverse publicity, the Su-
preme Court has pointed out that reversals of convictions as a result of the
denial of due process are rare indeed."0 3 This fact alone makes it suspect
that defense-generated publicity will ever sufficiently prejudice the prose-
cution's case.'04
One of the reasons why reversals are so rare is that those remedial mea-
sures suggested in Sheppard-searching voir dire, continuances, change of
venue and sequestration of the jury05"-are usually sufficient to retrieve the
harm of adverse publicity.'0 In addition, the bulk of empirical studies on
the effects of pretrial publicity on the jury demonstrates that extrajudicial
comments have virtually no impact on the decision-making processes of
the jury.0 7 It is not that jurors are without prejudice or that they are
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 242 (1964) (stating that it would have been impossible for Lee
Harvey Oswald to have gotten a fair trial).
103. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 554. Accord Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
at 364. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975) (held that defendant received
fair trial even though members of jury learned from news accounts about prior felony convic-
tion or facts about crime with which he was charged); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 548-
49 (1962) (grand jury which indicted defendant held not biased by adverse publicity circulat-
ing in area where he was indicted and tried); United States ex rel Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S.
454, 462-464 (1961) (held that defendant had not been prejudiced by news coverage surround-
ing trial); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 191-93 (1952) (held that defendant had not been
denied a fair trial by pretrial publicity, caused as a result of District Attorney's statement to
press that he believed defendant was guilty); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31
(D.C.Cir. 1976), cert. denied Mitchell v. United States, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (despite pervasive
"Watergate" news coverage, defendants were not denied a fair trial); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234, 240, 242 (6th Cir. 1975) (rejecting claim that prejudicial publicity surrounding Kent
State controversy deprived defendant of fair trial); Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 204, 206
(5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied 423 U.S. 888 (1976) (record did not support claim that
adverse publicity relating to My Lai Massacre tainted fairness of Calley's trial); United
States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C.Cir. 1974) (properly conducted voir dire dispensed with
claim that defendant has been prejudiced as a result of "Watergate" news coverage); Wansley
v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974) (adverse publicity
too remote in time to effect fairness of trial); Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969) (trial court's voir dire and examination of jurors during
trial regarding prejudicial articles adequately assured that the accused received a fair trial).
104. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 607.
105. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363.
106. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. at 802 (publicity subsided seven months before
jury trial and voir dire thoroughly dispelled chance of biased jury); Stroble v. California, 343
U.S. at 195 (passage of time, thorough voir dire diminished impact of initial adverse public-
ity); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 64-70 (voir dire examination succeeded in
eliminating any unfairness that might otherwise have resulted from "Watergate"). See Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 569 (court could not say that alternatives to prior
restraint would not have dissipated harm); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 364 (passage of
time and other circumstances may dissipate harm).
107. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research
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paragons of virtue; rather, studies show that jurors are willing and able to
put aside extrajudicial information and to reach a fair verdict based upon
the evidence before them.' 8
But because those few sensational cases do arise in which the harm of
prejudicial publicity cannot be retrieved, except by a new trial, DR 7-107
was promulgated.'"9 The important point to be made, however, is that in
all of those sensational cases necessitating DR 7-107, the prejudice was to
the defendant's right to a fair trial, and was caused either by the prosecutor
"going public" or by the judge's failure to take sufficient action to preserve
due process, and not by any extrajudicial comments issued by the defense
attorney.10 Indeed, the Reardon Report, which recommended the proto-
type of DR 7-107, concluded from its research that the preponderance of
Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515, 528 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Simon]. Simon reached this conclusion after surveying the following
studies: Kline & Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effects on Law School Mock Juries, 43
JOURNALISM Q. 113 (1966); Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on
Jurors' Verdict, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14-15 (1975) (only study supporting proposition
that pretrial publicity may effect jurors); Simon, Murder, Juries, and the Press, 3
TRANSACTION 40 (May-June 1966); Simon & Eimerman, The Jury Finds Not Guilty: Another
Look at Media Influence on the Jury, 48 JOURNALISM Q. 343 (1971); Tans & Chaffee, Pretrial
Publicity and Juror Prejudice, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 647 (1966); Wilcox & McCombs, Crime Story
Elements and Fair Trial/Free Press, unpublished report summarized in Wilcox, The Press,
the Jury and the Behavioral Sciences, 9 JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS 20 (1968). See ABA
STANDARDS 1978, supra note 57, stating that ". . . in the majority of criminal cases, extrajudi-
cial statements by trial attorneys have no impact at all." Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted). See
generally ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 16, recognizing absence of empirical data which
could determine the actual effect of prejudicial publicity on the jury, and recommending
further research along these lines.
108. Simon, supra note 107, at 528, stating:
Perhaps more importantly [than empirical studies], recent experience in actual
trial situations compels the same conclusion. The facts are that, despite substantial
adverse publicity, Angela Davis, John Connally and John Mitchell all were acquitted.
These verdicts may be the most reliable and powerful data we have about jurors'
ability to withstand pretrial publicity.
(footnotes omitted).
A related misconception courts and lawyers seem to have about pretrial publicity is that
it will inevitably permeate the minds of the jurors. The fact of the matter is that most
prospective jurors do not keep up with the news. As the court illustrated in United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d at 62-63 n.37: "Most of the venire simply did not pay an inordinate
amount of attention to Watergate. This may come as a surprise to lawyers and judges, but it
is simply a fact of life that matters which interest them may be less fascinating to the public
generally."
109. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 363.
110. See notes 102 and 103 supra and accompanying text. See generally Carsey v. United
States, 392 F.2d 810, 812 (D.C.Cir. 1967) (greater damage to fair trial by misconduct of
prosecutor).
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prejudicial information was generated by releases to the press by police
officials or by prosecutors."' Although defense counsel were found to go
public in an attempt to counter adverse publicity or, occasionally, to create
a favorable climate in the press, there was no evidence cited in the Reardon
Report of defense counsel sufficiently prejudicing the prosecution's case." 2
In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to confront a case in which defense-
generated publicity was so pervasive that irreparable harm was done to the
prosecution's case."' As one commentorl" has stated:
That is hardly surprising, of course, since "the scales of justice in the eyes of
the public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against an accused after his
indictment." The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, the impact of
an indictment upon the general public is so great that few defendants will
be able to overcome it, much less turn it to their advantage."1
Despite all of this information demonstrating that the prospect is
"remote, if not fanciful,""' 6 that the unbridled speech of defense lawyers
will prejudice the prosecution of criminal matters, DR 7-107 has been
111. See REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 26, 28, 30-36, 39, 41, 98.
112. Id. at 37, 42, 175-76 (describing the occurrence of defense-generated publicity as
"relatively infrequent," and "occasional"). See MEDINA REPORT, supra note 3, at 43-55 (to
same effect as REARDON REPORT).
Despite the findings of the REARDON REPORT, the Committee suggested that DR 7-107 apply
to both prosecutors and defense attorneys. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 80-86. The
decision of the REARDON REPORT was apparently based on the Committee's reading of three
cases. First, the Reardon Committee relied on Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 361, in which
the Supreme Court stated in dictum that prejudicial publicity was attributable to the defense
attorney. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 42-43, 80 n.1. But see note 63 supra and accompa-
nying text.
Second, the REARDON REPORT decision was based on United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,
313 F.2d at 378 (dissenting opinion), in which it was stated that the majority of the prejudicial
publicity could be traced to the defense. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 37, 86. The
important realization in Bloeth is that even though the defense attorney embarked on a
publicity campaign, the prosecution was still able to convict the defendant, further demon-
strating the improbability of defense-oriented publicity prejudicing the prosecution.
And finally, the Reardon Committee was influenced by dictum in State v. Van Duyne, 43
N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), in which the court stated that Canon 20, predecessor of
DR 7-107, applied to prosecutors and defense attorneys. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at
86. The claim in Van Duyne was, however, that adverse publicity caused by the police and
prosecutor had deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
For another example of the defense attorney attempting to influence the public, see State
v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968).
113. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 611.
114. Id.
115. Id., quoting from Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250. Accord,
Silence Orders, supra note 73, at 600, 604.
116. Freedman & Starwood, supra note 59, at 612 n.35.
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equally applied to defense lawyers for the stated reason that it is the least
restrictive means of furthering the government's substantial interest in a
fair trial."7 This application to defense attorneys is not based upon case
authority or empirical data, but, at best, is based upon the mere specula-
tion that the prosecution's case may be prejudiced." 8 Thus, the question
still remains: is there any real justification for applying the proscriptions
of DR 7-107 to defense attorneys?
117. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 421 F. Supp. at 366; Chicago Council, supra note 19, at 250;
ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 19-20; ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra note 57, at 2 n.4.
The only good reason ever stated for applying no-comment rules to prosecutors and defense
counsel alike was that, on the basis of fair play, both sides should be playing by the same set
of rules. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT, supra note 3, at 20 (fear that prosecutor will not remain
silent if defense goes public); ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra note 57, at 2 n.4 (DR 7-107 achieves
"parity"); MEDINA REPORT, supra note 3, at 18-19 (prosecutor cannot be expected to remain
silent if defense embarks on publicity campaign); Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 621, 625 n.13 (1977) ("unfairness of holding down one party. . . while the other kicks
away"); 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 654, 657 n.12 (1976) (questioning basic fairness of muzzling
prosecution while defense is given free reign to make out-of-court statements). This "fair
play" argument fails, however, to perceive the nature of the prosecutor's right to free speech
in the fair trial-free press situation. Admittedly, the prosecutor has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to freedom of expression. But when that right conflicts with the defendant's right
to a fair trial, on the balance, it is outweighed and must give way. See note 73 supra. In
addition, as an officer of the court and a representative of the state, the prosecutor's right to
freedom of speech is inherently restricted by principles of due process. Id. And finally, as a
practical matter, the prosecutor is hardly justified in responding to statements by the defense,
since nothing the defense says is likely to overcome the clout of permissible comments of the
prosecution, much less prejudice the prosecution's case. See notes 90 and 112-115 supra and
accompanying text.
118. But see Cole & Spaks, Defense Counsel and the First Amendment: "A Time to Keep
Silence and a Time to Speak'" 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 347 (1974), concluding that rules restricting
defense lawyers' comments about pending litigation is consonant with the first amendment,
and the clear and present danger test is not the constitutional measure of such rules.
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (involv-
ing exercise of free speech in a school environment), in which the Supreme Court stated:
[Iun our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough
to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from absolute regimen-
tation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's opinion may inspire fear
. .. .But our Constitution says we must take this risk, . . . and our history says that
it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and
live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
Id. at 508-09 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
For authorities recommending a different standard for defense attorneys, see, e.g., Freed-
man & Starwood, supra note 59; Barth, Background Paper, in Report of the Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on Justice, Publicity and the First Amendment, RIHrs IN CoNLICT
76 (1976); Isaacson, Fair Trial and Free Press: An Opportunity For Coexistence, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 561, 568-70 (1977); Kaplan, Of Babies and Bathwater, 29 STAN. L. REv. 621, 625 n.13
(1977); Silence Orders, supra note 73, at 604, 606-08.
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II. BENCH TRIALS
DR 7-107 also prohibits comments by lawyers involved in pending crimi-
nal bench trials."9 With respect to its application to bench trials, the
Fourth Circuit agreed with Hirschkop and held that the no-comment rule
was "unnecessarily broad" and, therefore, unconstitutional.' 2 The court
limited its holding with the recognition that DR 7-107 would be appropri-
ate during the pretrial stages of criminal proceedings,' 2 ' but the court
stated that, "when it becomes apparent that the case is to be tried by a
judge alone, we see no compelling reason for restricting lawyers' comments
in order to assure a fair trial."'' 2
The court noted that no case could be shown in which adverse publicity
had been the source of interference with a fair bench trial.'1 In addition,
119. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371; Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
at 256. See ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra note 57, at 2. See generally REARDON REPORT, supra
note 3, at 22, where the Committee stated: "Our problem is of course principally concerned
with the jury trial cases, and a relatively small percentage of those, although it must be
remembered that adverse publicity, if it is sufficiently pervasive, may affect a judge . ..."
120. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371-72. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that with
respect to bench trials DR 7-107 did not satisfy the second part of the Martinez test (supra
notes 9-13) requiring that restrictions on free speech must be "no greater than [are] neces-
sary or essential" to protect the right to a fair trial. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
But see Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 256-57, where the Seventh Circuit
held that there was no distinction between criminal trials heard before a jury or a judge. The
Chicago Council decision suggested a two-fold benefit from rules proscribing speech of law-
yers involved in pending criminal bench trials: (1) they prevent the necessity of judges
attempting to remove from their minds information that they should not consider, and (2)
such rules prevent the appearance of decisions being based on improper evidence. Id. at 257.
See generally ABA STANDARDS 1978, supra note 57, at 2 n.3, recognizing that there is a
strong argument against applying no-comment rules to bench trials.
121. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371, referring to such pretrial stages as the investiga-
tion, grand jury and arraignment proceedings. Accord, Chicago Council, 522 F.2d at 256 n.14.
122. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371. The Fourth Circuit stated that those considera-
tions which lead it to uphold the constitutionality of DR 7-107 with respect to criminal jury
trials, see notes 14-36 supra and accompanying text, were inapplicable to criminal trials tried
before a judge. Id. at 371.
123. Id. at 371. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965), where the Supreme Court
said:
It is, of course, true that most judges will be influenced only by what they see and hear
in court. However, judges are human; and the legislature has the right to recognize
the danger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials, will be consciously or
unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or near their courtrooms both prior to
and at the time of the trial.
The Fourth Circuit distinguished the situation in Cox from the restrictions of DR 7-107. In
Cox, which involved the constitutionality of a statute that proscribed picketing or parading
around the courthouse with the intent to interfere with the administration of justice, the
Supreme Court stated that it was not dealing with pure speech but with speech mixed with
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the court stated that those sensational cases'24 necessitating the adoption
of DR 7-107 were all tried by a jury.'25 Moreover, the court believed it was
unlikely that comments by lawyers regarding pending litigation could
threaten the fairness of bench trials, and the court refused to assume that
such comments would influence the judge's rulings with respect to the
accused or the state.'2 1 Indeed, the court pointed out that such a suggestion
had been dispensed with in Pennekamp v. Florida, 27 in which the Supreme
Court stated that "too many fine-drawn assumptions against the inde-
pendence of judicial action must be made to call such a possibility a clear
and present danger.'
28
Furthermore, the court stated that judges in criminal trials frequently
must determine whether to suppress highly prejudicial and incriminating
evidence, such as confessions and lineup identifications. If the evidence is
excluded, the judge must nevertheless determine whether the accused is
guilty or innocent without considering the evidence which he has held to
be inadmissable.'12 As a practical matter, the court stated that it did not
know "what comments a lawyer could make about a pending case that
would be more prejudicial than the information a judge must consider as
he separates the wheat from the chaff during the course of an ordinary
bench trial.' 21 3
conduct. Since DR 7-107 prohibits only pure speech the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was
not persuasive authority for applying the no-comment rule to bench trials. Hirschkop v.
Snead, 594 F.2d at 372. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 256 (Cox is
relevant but not dispositive).
124. See note 102 supra.
125. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371.
126. Id.
127. 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (reversal of contempt conviction for publishing editorials and
cartoons which were highly critical of judges).
128. Id. at 349. The Pennekamp Court also said that "criticism of [judges'] actions could
not affect their ability to decide the issues." Id. at 348. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
376 (1947) ("[jjudges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy cli-
mate"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941) (to consider that a lawyer's extrajudi-
cial comments would influence a judge's judgment "would be to impute to judges a lack of
firmness, wisdom, or honor,-which we cannot accept as a major premise").
But cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1965) ("our judges are high-minded men and
women. But it is difficult to remain oblivious to the pressures that the news media can bring
to bear on them both directly and through the shaping of public opinion"); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. at 565 ("judges are human"); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 357 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("since judges, however stalwart, are human, the delicate task of administer-
ing justice ought not to be made unduly difficult by irrepsonsible press"); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (possibility that judges will be prejudiced); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257 ("judges are human").
129. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, supra
note 19, at 256-57.
130. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 371.
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Since the Fourth Circuit concluded that "the gain to fair bench trials
[was] minimal, and the restrictions on first amendment rights [were]
substantial,"'"' the court held that with respect to bench trials DR 7-107
was unconstitutionally overbroad.
IV. SENTENCING
DR 7-107(E) 3 2 applies to the post-criminal trial stage, prior to sentenc-
ing, and proscribes statements by lawyers involved in the trial that "are
reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence."1' The court noted
that in Virginia, when a criminal trial is tried by a jury, it is the duty of
the jury to determine guilt or innocence and to impose the sentence. 13
Thus, the court held that when that procedure was followed, its decision
regarding the constitutionality of DR 7-107 in criminal jury trials was
applicable.'3
However, when the judge rather than the jury imposes the sentence, the
court held that its decision regarding the unconstitutionality of DR 7-107
in criminal bench trials was applicable. 3 The court's decision was based
on the fact that when a judge imposes sentence on the defendant, he" 'may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either
as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which it
may come.' "'1 3 In view of this broad discretion granted to a sentencing
131. Id. at 372.
132. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 375 (Appendix); RULES OF COURT, 211 Va. 295,
347-50 (1970); Appendix to this comment, infra.
133. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372.
134. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295 (Repl. Vol. 1975), which reads: "Within the limits
prescribed by law, the term of confinement in the penitentiary or in jail and the amount of
fine, if any, of a person convicted of a criminal offense, shall be ascertained by the jury, or
by the court in cases tried without a jury."
135. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372. See notes 14-36 supra and accompanying text.
Cf. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257 (no consideration of trials where
sentence is imposed by jury). See generally ABA PRoJEcT, supra note 3, at 19, stating that
Committee was concerned primarily with extrajudicial comments where imposition of sent-
ence is by jury; REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 46, 93, stating that problem during post-
trial stage was small, but that both prosecutor and defense attorney should argue sentencing
in court. See also notes 58-118 supra and accompanying text, questioning why DR 7-107
should apply to defense attorneys as it is applicable here.
136. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372. Cf. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522
F.2d at 257 (holding that comments restricted by DR 7-107(E) could never be deemed a
serious and imminent threat of interference with a fair trial). See generally ABA STANDARDS
1978, supra note 57, which has eliminated rule (E) regarding imposition of sentence from its
revised standard.
137. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372, quoting from United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972) (involving constitutionally invalid convictions). See also Williams v. New York,
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judge, the court saw "no compelling reason for a rule that prohibits lawyers
from commenting about all cases pending sentencing."'38 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit held that DR 7-107(E) was unnecessarily broad when sentence is
imposed by a judge rather than a jury.'39
V. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
DR 7-107 (F) 10 applies the prohibitions of the no-comment rule to profes-
sional and juvenile disciplinary proceedings.' With respect to professional
disciplinary hearings, the Fourth Circuit recognized that they were not
usually tried by juries.' Consequently, the court held that with respect
to professional disciplinary proceedings, DR 7-107(F) was unnecessarily
broad for the same reasons the court delineated in its opinion regarding
the unconstitutionality of DR 7-107 when applied to criminal bench
trials.'
With respect to juvenile disciplinary proceedings, the court noted that
a jury may be involved.'" When a juvenile in a disciplinary proceeding is
tried by a jury, the court's decision upholding the constitutionality of DR
7-107 in criminal jury trials is directly applicable."5 On the other hand,
when it becomes apparent that the juvenile will be tried by a judge, the
337 U.S. 241 (1949) (defendant not denied due process when trial judge imposed death
sentence over jury's recommendation of life imprisonment on basis of state law permitting
him to consider other relevant materials).
138. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372.
139. Id., stating that DR 7-107(E) did not satisfy the second part of Martinez (supra notes
9-13) requiring that restrictions on free speech must be "no greater than (are) necessary or
essential" to further the governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at
413.
The Fourth Circuit also held that the broad proscription in DR 7-107(E) of statements
"reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence" was "void for vagueness." Hirschkop
v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372. Cf. id. at 383 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting), stating that
DR 7-107(E) should be invalidated in its entirety for vagueness. See generally note 36 supra.
140. See Appendix infra.
141. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372.
Apparently the issue of the constitutionality of DR 7-107(F) was not before the Seventh
Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1971).
142. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372.
143. Id. See notes 119-31 supra and accompanying text.
Seemingly, the Fourth Circuit was not impressed with the built-in limitation of DR 7-
107(F), which states that it applies only "when pertinent and consistent with other law
applicable to such proceedings." See Appendix infra. This oversight is harmless, since that
part of DR 7-107(F) is probably "void for vagueness." See generally note 36 supra.
144. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372.
145. Id. See notes 14-36 supra and accompanying text.
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court held that DR 7-107(F) was unconstitutionally overbroad for the same
reasons cited by the court for criminal bench trials.'"
VI. Civm ACTIONS
DR 7-107(G)'47 prohibits lawyers involved in civil actions from making
a broad range of comments during the investigation or litigation of the
cases.' The Fourth Circuit agreed with Hirschkop and held that DR 7-
107(G) was unconstitutionally overbroad.' The court recognized that our
legal system requires that parties to civil actions be assured the right to a
fair trial. "'The very purpose of a court system,"' the court stated, "'is to
adjudicate controversies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and
solemnity of the courtroom according to legal procedures."
5 0
Nevertheless, the court pointed out several differences between criminal
and civil litigation that justified a different rule in each type of litigation.
Initially, the court stated that civil cases are often more protracted than
criminal trials as a result of broader civil discovery rules, the greater com-
plexity of issues in many civil cases, and the priority given criminal cases
because of the right to a speedy trial. 5' In addition, civil trials often involve
important social issues, about which the lawyers involved in the litigation
can enlighten the public. 5 Moreover, the Reardon Report, 113 which recom-
146. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 372-73. See notes 119-31 supra and accompanying
text.
The court noted that its decision was limited to whether DR 7-107(F) was necessary to
ensure the fairness of professional and juvenile disciplinary proceedings, and did not involve
protection of other interests of privacy and confidentiality, which are governed by other
regulations. See VA. CODE ANN. §16.1-299-309.1 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (juvenile proceedings);
VA. S. CT. RULES 6: IV: 13J(5) (professional disciplinary proceedings).
147. See Appendix infra.
148. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373.
149. Id. Accord, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257-59.
150. Hirschkop v. Snead, supra note 6, 594 F.2d at 373, quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (involving constitutionality of stat-
ute prohibiting speech mixed with conduct). Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Cox is the
only explicit Supreme Court authority for the application of no-comment rules to civil trials.
151. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Accord, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d at 258.
152. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Accord Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d at 258. But cf. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. at 1147 (lawyer is rarely
only articulate voice concerning important social issues).
The Fourth Circuit also stated that it was not enough that the lawyer is free to comment
at the end of the case because the first amendment protects not only the content of speech
but also its timeliness. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Apparently the court must have
thought that the need for lawyers to comment on social issues was more important in civil
trials than in criminal trials, and that the timeliness of lawyers' speech in criminal trials was
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mended the adoption of no-comment rules by courts in criminal prosecu-
tions, did not focus on civil actions.' 4 Finally, the court stated that there
were no empirical data to justify restrictions on lawyers' speech to protect
the fairness of civil actions.' 5 The court said that it was unaware of any
judgment in a civil action being reversed because of prejudicial publicity;
in fact, the principal civil case in which a "gag order" was imposed on a
lawyer was reversed because the order violated the first amendment.,"
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit stated: "The dearth of evidence that
lawyers' comments taint civil trials and the courts' ability to protect confi-
dential information establish that the rule's restrictions on freedom of
speech are not essential to fair civil trials."'5
Judge Widener dissented from that part of the court's per curiam opin-
ion that held that DR 7-107(G) was unconstitutionally broad.,, Judge
Widener stated that "civil jury trials, like criminal, also deserve to be
protected.""'5 The Judge contended that the line should properly be drawn
between jury and bench trials, rather than between criminal jury trials and
civil actions.""
an insubstantial right. See notes 55 and 79-84 supra and accompanying text.
153. Supra note 3.
154. REARDON REPORT, supra note 3, at 84, stating that "civil litigation is not included
because it falls outside the scope of the Committee's assignment." Accord, Judicial Report,
45 F.R.D. at 393 n.1. But cf. Medina Report, supra note 3, at 25, recommending no-comment
rules in both criminal and civil actions, but without analyzing the differences between the
two.
155. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Unfortunately, the court was not concerned
about the lack of empirical data to support the application of no-comment rules to defense
attorneys in criminal jury trials. See notes 109-13 supra and accompanying text.
156. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir.
1975) (gag order involving civil cases arising out of Kent State controversy).
157. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that DR 7-107(G)
did not satisfy the second part of the Martinez test, requiring that restrictions on speech must
be "no greater than [are] necessary or essential" to protect the governmental interest in-
volved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413. See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
The Fourth Circuit also held that DR 7-107(G)(5) which prohibits "[any other matter
reasonably likely to interfere with the fair trial of the action" was "void for vagueness."
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373. Accord, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
at 259. See generally note 36 supra.
158. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 381-84 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Widener concurred with the rest of the court's per curiam opinion, except with regard
to DR 7-107(E), discussed supra at note 139.
159. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 382 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 382-83. Judge Widener agreed with the court's opinion that DR 7-107(G) was
unconstitutional as to civil actions tried before a judge, but for a different reason. He stated
that the rule was invalid because there was "no reasonable likelihood of impairing the integ-
rity of the trial," and not because the rule was overbroad. Id. at 383. Query whether there is
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Judge Widener disputed the court's rationale for invalidating DR 7-
107(G). He suggested that the fact that civil actions are more prolonged
than criminal prosecutions does not suffice as a reason for not protecting
civil jury trials.'"' He also pointed out that the need for public enlighten-
ment by lawyers was much greater in criminal cases, where the state could
deprive the accused of his life, than in civil cases, where the defendant
usually could be deprived only of his property.'62 Furthermore, Judge Wi-
dener stated that no empirical were was necessary to show that, if a crimi-
nal jury could be affected by lawyers' comments, a civil jury could be
similarly affected, since both juries are comprised of the same people.'613
In addition, Judge Widener asserted that the specific proscriptions of
DR 7-107(G), protecting the fairness of civil actions, were essentially the
same as the proscriptions of DR 7-107(B), protecting the fairness of crimi-
nal trials.' Since the court held that the restrictions of DR 7-107(B) were
constitutionally permissible in criminal jury trials, Judge Widener argued
that the restrictions of DR 7-107(G) were constitutionally permissible in
civil jury trials.' 5
The essential differences between the court's per curiam opinion and
Judge Widener's dissenting opinion is that the court concluded that the
state's interest in protecting the right to a fair trial and the due administra-
tion of justice was more compelling in criminal jury trials than in civil
cases, whereas Judge Widener believed that the state's interest was just
as substantial in civil jury trials.'66
any real difference between the rationale of the opinions.
Cf. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 378 (Phillips, J., concurring). Judge Phillips agreed
generally with Judge Widener, except in two respects: (1) he believed that the specific prohi-
bitions of DR 7-107(G), regarding civil actions were more broadly stated than those of DR 7-
107(B) regarding criminal trials, and (2) he believed that the state has an added interest in
protecting the criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. For these reasons Judge
Phillips concurred in the court's per curiam opinion. Id.
161. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 382 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Id. See generally notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
163. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 382 (Widener, J.,° concurring and dissenting). See
generally VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-345 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (jury selection process in civil actions);
VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-260 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (jury selection in criminal trials is generally
same as in civil actions).
164. Hirqchkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 383 (Wfdener, J., concurring and dissenting). But
see Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258-59 (specific prohibitions of DR 7-
107(G) are overbroad); note 160 supra, discussing Judge Phillips' concurring opinion in
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 376-78.
165. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 382-83 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. Although not expressly, the Fourth Circuit evidently relied heavily on the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 257-58, where the
Seventh Circuit stated that there was a greater need to protect the right to a fair trial in
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:213
VII. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DR 7-107(H)'6 7 prohibits lawyers associated with administrative pro-
ceedings from making a broad range of comments during the pendency of
the proceedings. 8 The Fourth Circuit held that DR 7-107(H) was unneces-
sarily broad and, therefore, unconstitutional. 6 9
The court stated that there was no factual basis to justify restrictions
on lawyers' freedom of expression to protect the fairness of administrative
hearings. ' 6 The court stated further that it was unaware of any administra-
tive decision being set aside as a result of prejudicial comments by law-
yers.'7" Also, the court noted, administrative proceedings, like civil actions,
often involve issues of public concern, thus requiring that lawyers asso-
ciated with the proceedings be permitted to comment publicly.' 2 Since the
prohibitions of DR 7-107(H) are very broad in nature, the court believed
that their effect would be to chill public discussion by lawyers regarding
those social issues.' 3 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that the restric-
tions of DR 7-107(H) were constitutionally invalid for overbreadth.14
criminal cases because the sixth amendment explicitly requires a trial "by impartial jury"
in criminal cases, whereas the seventh amendment only guarantees a "fair trial" in civil
actions. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit stated that the invocation of the fifth amendment
right to due process did not justify restricting speech in civil trials. In addition, the criminal
accused has a right to a "speedy trial," whereas civil litigants do not. rd. Cf. Hirschkop v.
Snead, 594 F.2d at 376-78 (Phillips, J., concurring). But see Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at
382-83 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting) (criticizing court for giving priority to crimi-
nal jury trials over civil jury trials).
167. See Appendix infra.
168. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 373-74. Apparently, the issue of the constitutionality
of DR 7-107(H) was not before the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975).
169. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 374.
170. Id. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 3; Judicial Report, supra note 3; REARDON REPORT,
supra note 3. None of these reports was concerned with prejudicial comments of lawyers
during administrative hearings. See also note 155 supra, as it applies here.
171. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 374.
172. Id. See note 152 supra ("issues of public concern" in civil actions).
173. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 374.
174. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that DR 7-107(H) did not satisfy the second part of
the Martinez test, requiring that restrictions on speech must be "no greater than (are) neces-
sary or essential" to protect the governmental interest involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. at 413.
The court also held that DR 7-107(H)(5) which prohibits comments relating to "[any
other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing" was "void for vagueness."
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 374. See generally note 34 supra.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Hirschkop v. Snead makes it clear that
extrajudicial comments by attorneys, regarding pending litigation with
which they are associated, may be prohibited only in criminal cases tried
before a jury.'75 This aspect of the court's decision is eminently sound for
two reasons. First, although courts try to preserve the fairness and integrity
of their processes for all litigants, the right of the criminal accused to a fair
trial has historically received the utmost protection by our judicial system.
It is not that the rights of other litigants are insubstantial, but that the
rights of the criminally accused are given constitutional priority.',6 And,
secondly, there is simply no case authority or empirical data that would
justify restrictions on lawyers' speech in judicial proceedings other than
criminal jury trials.
Despite the virtues of the Hirschkop decision, there is one issue that is
still debatable, and one question that is yet unanswered. The debatable
issue concerns the appropriate standard by which the extrajudicial state-
ments of lawyers may be restricted. The court's per curiam opinion and
the principal dissenting opinion demonstrate the legal and practical argu-
ments for the "reasonably likelihood" and the "clear and present danger"
standards, respectively. The main thrust of those arguments is, however,
that neither standard stands on any firmer ground than the other when
incorporated into DR 7-107. The debatability of the issue is increased in
light of the conflicting decision of the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council
of Lawyers v. Bauer.'" Thus, it is safe to say that the jury is still out on
this issue.
Regardless of the appropriate standard for restricting lawyers' speech
under DR 7-107, there remains unanswered the fundamental question of
why the speech of defense attorneys should be restricted in the first place.
Even assuming that the state has a compelling interest in a fair trial that
outweighs the first amendment rights of defense lawyers, there has been
no showing that the application of no-comment rules to defense lawyers
furthers that governmental interest. The empirical studies with respect to
the fair trial-free press issue show that the overwhelming preponderance
of prejudice to a fair criminal trial is generated by the police or the prosecu-
175. But see Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d at 381-84 (Widener, J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (arguing for application of DR 7-107 in civil jury trials); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 256-57 (holding that DR 7-107 applies in criminal bench trials).
176. Compare the rights of the criminal accused under the sixth amendment with the
rights of civil litigants under the seventh amendment.
177. 522 F.2d at 249 (incorporating "serious and imminent threat" standard into DR 7-
107).
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tor rather than by defense counsel. And there has been no case cited in
which the prosecution's case was ever substantially prejudiced by the pub-
lic dissemination of information by the defense attorney. Indeed, it is
highly unlikely that anything the defense might say would ever threaten
irreparable prejudice to the prosecution, since "the scales of justice in the
eyes of the public are weighed extraordinarily heavy against an accused
after his indictment."''7 8
Unfortunately the Fourth Circuit never addressed itself to this impor-
tant question. If it had, the court might well have determined that the
application of DR 7-107 to defense attorneys was not "necessary or essen-
tial""' to the protection of the government's interest in a fair trial and,
therefore, that in this respect DR 7-107 suffered from overbreadth.
Stephen E. Baril
178. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 250.
179. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413.
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APPENDIX
DR 7-107 Trial Publicity.
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudi-
cial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-
nated by means of public communication and that does more than
state without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of
the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance
in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint,
information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or ar-
rest until the commencement of the trial or disposition without trial,
make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a rea-
sonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication and that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including
arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to
lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or state-
ment given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a
statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or
tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence, or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information nec-
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essary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any
dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use
of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence
seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in
the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudi-
cial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be dissemi-
nated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial,
parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or
refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a crimi-
nal matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law
firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or
participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by public communication
and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disci-
plinary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when perti-
nent and consistent with other law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during
its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public
records, that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness,
or prospective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
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refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party,
except as required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial
of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law
firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a
statement, other than a quotation from or reference to public records,
that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means
of public communication if it is made outside the official course of
the proceeding and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness,
or prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examina-
tions or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to submit to
such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions
of an interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hear-
ing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from
replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from
participating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or
other investigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and
associates from making an extrajudicial statement that he would be
prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
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